Indictment against Japan for Military Sexual Slavery during WWII (Women's International War Crime Tribunal, 2000)

Indictment against JAPAN for

Women*s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan*s Military Sexual Slavery

2000

  (08 November 2000 version)

Table of contents

I. HISOTRICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SEXUAL SLAVERY COMMITTED BY THE JAPANESE

MILITARY

A. Development of the Japanese military*s system of "comfort women", from its

 

introduction to its end ..... paras 1- 6

B. Historical background to the system of "comfort women" ..... paras 7 - 9

 

II. CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY

A. From the first Shanghai Incident in early 1932 to the outbreak of the

Asia-Pacific War (WW2) in December 1941 ..... paras 10 - 13

B. From the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War (WW2) to the defeat of Japan

..... para 14

C. During the period of the all-out war between Japan and China 1937-45 .....

 

paras 15 -19

 

III. INDIVIDUAL CHARGES

A. Sexual enslavement of UEDA Yoko and other Japanese "comfort women" .....

paras 20 -22

B. Sexual enslavement of SAWADA Noriko and other Japanese "comfort women"

..... paras 23 - 25

C. Sexual enslavement of the women in areas other than the six victimised

countries or regions represented at the present Tribunal ..... paras 26 - 33

D. Defendant Hirohito, Emperor Showa

a. his liability for the "Rape of Nanking" (the mass rape in Nanjing) .....

para 34 - 36

b. his liability for the cases of "comfort stations" ..... paras 37 - 41

 

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

A. Insufficiency of investigation and disclosure of the truth ..... paras 42

- 43

B. Non-fulfilment of duties for apology, reparation or prosecution .....

paras 44 - 46

C. Leaving the PTSD of the victimised persons grow worse ..... paras 47 - 49

 

V. FACTUAL GROUND TO THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

..... paras 50 - 56

 

VI. CONTENT OF THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS TO FULFIL

..... paras 57 - 61

 

----

  I. HISOTRICAL BACKGROUND TO THE SEXUAL SLAVERY COMMITTED BY THE JAPANESE

MILITARY

 

A. Development of the Japanese military*s system of "comfort women", from its

 

introduction to its end

 

1. The First Stage: 1932~First Shanghai Incident: Introduction of Systematic

Military Sexual Slavery : On January 28, 1932 in Shanghai, acts of aggression

 

on the part of the Japanese military led to landing parties of the Japanese

Navy to take the field, and culminated in an armed conflict against the

Chinese army. In February, Prime Minister Inukai and his cabinet decided to

dispatch forces of the Army. The presence of the Japanese military forces

increased to 17,000 including troops already stationed in Shanghai. At the

time of the first Shanghai Incident, displeased by the frequency of rape

committed by the Japanese military, OKAMURA Yasuji, Vice-Chief of the Staff

of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, requested that the Governor of Nagasaki

Prefecture [on Japan proper] send a group of “comfort women”.1  This

information is also verified in the personal diary of OKABE Naosaburo, Chief

Staff Officer of the same Expeditionary Army.2  As the army practice of

establishing “comfort stations” was modeled on that of the navy; it is

thought that the Navy had already had military "comfort stations” from a

much earlier time.3  As far as we can confirm from existing data, the

establishment of “comfort stations”by the Japanese military had begun at

the very latest in 1932. In the same year, Japan created the puppet state of

Manchukuo in north-eastern China, and according to official documents, in

1933 there was already a comfort station (14th mixed brigade, stationed in

Pingquan).4

 

2. The Second Stage: 1937 - Japan’s all-out war against China: Full-scale

Operation of the systematic military sexual slavery : The full-scale

operation of military “comfort stations” started around the time when Japan

 

entered the all-out general war against China after troops clashed at Marco

Polo Bridge on July 7, 1937. When the Second Shanghai　Incident began on

August 13, the Japanese military was again expanded and advanced on the

capital of Nanjing [Nanking].5 From around this time until the fall of

Nanjing on December 13 and for weeks afterward, rape committed by Japanese

soldiers continued unabated. The military took this situation seriously and

made an effort to set up new “comfort stations” and expand already existing

 

ones. Even after the major operations in Hankou and Guangdong in the fall of

1938, Chinese resistance continued and the war in China stagnated. With

Japanese troops being stationed for a long time in one location, the variety

of “comfort  stations”increased. For instance, some “comfort stations”

made as part of quartermaster sections, while others were operated by troops

for themselves. In addition, there were irregular travelling ones and

temporary ones. This makes it difficult to trace the development of the

system and the reality of sexual slavery later on.

 

3. Initially, women from mainland Japan and Korean women residing in Japan

were recruited and sent to China to be put in those “comfort stations.”

When demand exceeded the supply, however, women in the colonies were made

focus of recruitment as well. At that time, Korea was suffering from poverty

that was brought about by Japanese colonisation. Poverty forced many of the

Koreans to immigrate to Japan and Northeast China. Under such harsh

conditions, many girls and young women "applied" to "job opportunities",

cruelly enticed and deceived by sweet words (“There are good jobs,”

“You*ll make good money”), or taken under the power the Government-General

of Korea. In Taiwan, another colonised territory, not only were Chinese women

 

recruited, but there are also cases of women of indigenous ethnicity taken by

 

low-ranking police officials working under the auspices of the

Government-General of Taiwan. In China, recruitment took place in various

forms: women were deceived; powerful locals were made to supply women; and

prostitutes were forcibly taken away from local brothels. In many battle

zones where “comfort stations” did not exist, as in the case of

Yu-prefecture, Shanxi Province, local women were kidnapped from villages

during counter-guerrilla attacks and taken to where the troops were

stationed, where they suffered continuous rape.

 

4. HARA Zenshirou, Staff Officer with the Kwantung Army planned to collect

20,000 “comfort women” from the Korean Peninsula to prepare for the

Kwantung Army Special Exercise in July, 1941. MURAKAMI Sadao (impedimenta

team, 3rd section,  the Staff of Kwantung Army), who was took care of the

clerical matters for the plan, wrote in a letter to Hara (now owned by SENDA

Kako) that he was only able to collect 3000 women. This was an important

turning point for the military to start full-scale establishment and full

operation of “comfort stations”.

 

5. The Third Stage: 1941-1945 or the period of the Asia-Pacific War or WW2: 

       

On December 8, 1941, Asia-Pacific War started with the bombing of Pearl

Harbor.  Southern Expeditionary Army and Japanese forces under its wing

established "comfort stations" one after another throughout the Southeast

Asia and Pacific islands that they occupied. Around May 1942, when the

operation for Southern Expansion Doctrine was settled temporarily, Japanese

controlled territory line was at its largest in the time of war.  In Malaya,

"comfort stations" were established during the Malayan War. The establishment

 

of them in Singapore followed, right after the fall of the city on February

15, 1942.  In the Philippines, a "comfort station" was set up in Iloilo,

Panay Island as early as May 12, 1942. In Burma they were set up shortly

after the fall of Mandalay on May 1, and the fall of Myitkyina on May 8.

"Comfort Stations" were also established at most of other territories

occupied by Japanese military such as Indonesia, Andaman Islands,  Nikobal

Islands, Rabaul, Kavieng, Saipan, Truk Islands, Palau, Guam, etc.6  In those

occupied territories, Japanese women and Korean, Taiwanese and Chinese women

taken from colonised territories were brought for the establishment. Local

women were also put in there, as well as suffering conventional rape.

 

6. As indicated in the above, the time of the FirstShanghai Incident was the

first period, and the way the Japanese military increased the number of

"comfort stations" and expanded systematic collection of "comfort women",

following the expansion of war front and the development of the war, as the

"second period" began with the all-out war against China, then even further

in the "third period" along with the start of the Asia-Pacific War.

 

B. Historical background to the system of "comfort women"

 

7. Behind the system of "comfort women" were : a) colonial domination of

Taiwan, Korea and other areas and, b) development of Japanese system of

licensed sexual slavery and its introduction to and development in the

colonized areas.

       First of all, had there been no Japanese colonial domination, there

would have been no making of such a massive number of Korean and Taiwanese

women into "comfort women".  The victimisation of those women in such a

massive scale was made possible by the institutional violence that existed at

 

the time in the forms of: poverty, and destruction of farming communities and

 

families, both brought about as a result of the economic policy of the

colonial rule; maintaining and reorganising of patriarchy as a convenient

tool of control; such a system of education which deprived the people of

poorer classes of access to education, and so on.

 

8. Secondly, the racism / ethnocentrism, deeply rooted in the mentality of

the Japanese military and government of the time, to think that it was not

favourable to have Japanese women as "comfort women" but it was all right to

make women of the colonies as such, also contributed.

 

9. Thirdly, the modern Japanese system of licensed sexual slavery was a

product of re-organization in the Meiji period of its antecedent. It took the

 

European system as a model, but not exactly followed it. The Japanese women

of the proletariate / unpropertied class were gradually integrated into the

system. [translator*s note: It was a system where girls and young women were

traded, bound by debts and lived within brothels or such quarters. The

introduction of the modern licensing system, one may argue, gave an

impression in practice that such things as the trafficking of young girls and

 

women and debt bondage were not forbidden, although they were by law.]

       As the state and military of Japan’s Emperor system pushed its

aggression and colonization over Asia including Korea, Taiwan, "Manchuguo"

etc., this Japanese system of licensed sexual slavery was also transplanted

into those areas, and the local women in those areas were knitted into the

bottom of the system. During the course of this development, the transborder

routes for trafficking of women were established. In the background of the

invention itself of the "comfort women" system was the existence of this

already established Japanese system of licensed sexual slavery, a very

organized system for sexual exploitation of women, as described above.

 

II. CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY

 

A.. From the first Shanghai Incident in early 1932 to the outbreak of the

Asia-Pacific War (WW2) in December 1941

 

10. During this period the Japanese Military established many "comfort

stations" in war zones and occupied territories in China (including

north-eastern China). Expeditionary Army Headquarters, divisional, regimental

 

and battalion commanders and so on decided to set them up and ordered that

women be recruited. The rear staff officers and adjutant of the unit at each

level drew up concrete plans and comptroller divisions or others implemented

them. Some of the major examples are as follows:

  a. In March 1932, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army established a "comfort

station" in Shanghai. Deputy Chief of Staff OKAMURA Yasuji and Adjutant

General OKABE Naosaburo formulated a plan, and Staff Officer NAGAMI Toshinori

 

implemented it.8  For this case, General SHIRAKAWA Yoshinori, Commander of

the Shanghai Expeditionary Army should also be held responsible.

  b. In December 1937, the Central China Area Army issued directions

concerning the establishment of a military "comfort station". According to

these directions, the Second Section of the General Staff of the Shanghai

Expeditionary Army made a draft plan and Staff Officer CHO Isamu and others

were in charge of setting up the comfort station.9  The responsibility for

this case is shared by General MATSUI Iwane, Commander of the Central China

Area Army.

  c. In June 1938, Lieutenant-General OKABE Naosaburo, Chief of Staff of the

North China Area Army, directed the units stationed in North China to set up

"comfort stations".10 The responsibility for this case also lies with General

 

TERAUCHI Hisaichi, Commander of the North China Area Army.

  d. In May 1939,  21st Army that had occupied southern parts of China tried

to increase comfort women under their control to 1,400 through 1,600.11  The

responsibility for this case also lies with Lieutenant-General ANDO Rikichi,

Commander of the 21st Army.

 

11. In recruiting women from local residents in China, accounting officers,

military policemen and others were in charge of this task. They “entrusted”

 

the puppet government or municipal governors with the recruitment of local

women. In this case, the word “entrust” virtually meant to order. Some of

the major examples are as follows:

  e. In December 1937, Lieutenant-Colonel TERADA Masao, Staff Officer of the

10th Army, directed military policemen to recruit Chinese women and set up a

"comfort station" in Huzhou.12  The responsibility for this case also lies

with Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA Heisuke, Commander of the 10th Army.

  f. In August 1940, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Independent Mountain

Artillery Regiment, which was stationed in a village in Hubei Province,

“entrusted” the village mayor with the recruitment of women.13  Forcibly

recruited women burst out crying when they were made to undergo a venereal

inspection. The medical officer wrote in his diary that "they might have

unwillingly come here probably because they were finally persuaded [by an

influential man of the village] that their recruitment would help save the

village."14  The responsibility for this act must go to Colonel HARADA

Tsurukichi, Commander of the 2nd Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment.

 

12. When recruiting "comfort women" in Korea, Taiwan and Japan, the Japanese

military forces in China either selected civilian agents and sent them to

recruit women, or asked the Governments-General of Korea and Taiwan, and the

Home Ministry to do so.

  g. As to the former recruitment procedure, the War Ministry approved it.15

  h. With regard to the latter procedure, there is a clear example of

recruitment in Japan. In November 1938, the 21st Army headquarters decided to

 

establish "comfort stations" in the southern part of China. Then the Army

entrusted that task to the Home Ministry, which directed the police

authorities of five prefectures to select civilian agents to recruit 400

women.16 It is Major KUMON Arifumi, Staff Officer of the 21st Army, and

Colonel KOMATSU Mitsuhiko, Recruitment Section Chief of the War Ministry’s

Personnel Bureau, that asked the Home Ministry to recruit "comfort women".

Within the Home Ministry, Police Bureau Chief HONMA Kiyoshi gave directions

to prefectural governors. Moreover, the 21st Army also requested the

Government-General of Taiwan, which recruited 300 women.17 The responsibility

 

for this case goes to Lieutenant-General Ando Rikichi, Commander of the 21st

Army, War Minister ITAGAKI Seishiro, Lieutenant-General, Home Minister and

Admiral SUETSUGU Nobumasa, and KOBAYASHI Seizo, the Governor-General of

Taiwan.

      These casese above indicate that, in Korea and Taiwan, the

Governments-Generals used civilian recruiters and kept them under their own

control under cover .

 

13. i. In July 1941, the Japanese Army drew up a plan for invading the Soviet

 

Union

and tried to place forces of about 800,000 in "Manchuguo" near the Soviet

border under the name of the Kwantung Army Special Exercise.

These operations were cancelled in September 1941. However, the Kwantung

Army, which had promoted the operations, is said to have tried to recruit 20,

000 women through the Korean Government-General.18  Though only about 3,000

women were actually recruited, the responsibility for this case would go to

Lieutenant-General UMEZU Yoshijiro, Commander of the Kwantung Army, and

Korean Governor-General MINAMI Jiro.

 

B. From the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War to the defeat of Japan

 

14. In this period, the core organs of the Japanese Military came to control

the establishment of "comfort stations" and the recruitment of the women.

With regard to the Army, the War Ministry’s Adjutant-general Section, Awards

 

Section and others were in charge.19 Concerning the Navy, the Navy Ministry’

s Naval Affairs Bureau and Naval Preparations Bureau were in charge.20 This

means that even in Korea and Taiwan, it became common to recruit women

through headquarters of Korea Army and Taiwan Army (area armies), not through

 

the Governments-General. The following cases indicate this fact.

  j. In 1942, the Southern Expeditionary Army that occupied vast areas of

Southeast Asia and the Pacific Region were setting up "comfort stations" in

various places. For example, in order to set them up in Borneo, the Southern

Expeditionary Army Headquarters asked the Taiwan Army Headquarters through

the War Ministry to recruit 50 women. Under the directions of the War

Minister, the Taiwan Army selected three civilian brokers and made them

recruit 50 women. Then the Taiwan Army Headquarters asked the War Minister’s

 

approval for these brokers and women to travel to Borneo, and got the

permission from the adjutant of the War Minister.21  The responsibility for

this case goes to General TERAUCHI Hisaichi, Commander of the Southern

Expeditionary Army, Lieutenant-General ANDO Rikichi, Commander of the Taiwan

Army, and General TOJO Hideki, War Minister, who was also the Prime Minister.

      Given these facts, it can be said that the responsibility of the

Japanese

Military, especially its core organs, became heavier after 1942.

 

Reference : chart of the Japanese Army's Chain of Command for Expeditionary

Armies in 1942 [see affidavit]

[the following notes are for the chart]

Note 1: China Expeditionary Army was set up in September 1939, with the

former Expeditionary Army for Central China at the core, and with the former

Northern China Army (Beijing) and the former 23rd Army (Guangzhou) also under

 

its command.

Note 2: Each Expeditionary Army came under direct jurisdiction and supreme

command of the emperor. The Chief of Staff issued military commands, and the

War Minister administrative orders, which were within their assigned

discretion. The matters regarding military "comfort women" were dealt with by

 

the Staff of each Expeditionary Army (especially staff in rear).

[source: YOSHIMI Yoshiaki and HAYASHI Hirofumi 1995 (eds.) Collaborative

Research: Japanese Military Comfort Women. Otsuki Shoten, Tokyo]

 

C. During the period of the all-out war between Japan and China 1937-45

 

15. In the case of the Army, the War Ministry’s Military Administration

Bureau and Medical Affairs Bureau were involved in the establishment and

management of "comfort stations". The former was required to maintain

military discipline and morale and the latter to prevent the spread of

venereal disease. The War Ministry's Intendance Bureau and the Army

Quartermaster Depot were also involved in providing condoms and preventive

medicine. 23

 

16. The "comfort station" system was nothing but military sexual slavery.

Nevertheless, the Japanese Military, from top officers to the lowest ranks,

did not oppose this system. They went on establishing them one after another.

 

The directions for establishing "comfort stations" were issued, but there

were no orders issued to abolish them, except in the few cases with the war

situation growing very badly and in the case in Semarang, Indonesia (in which

 

Dutch women were made "comfort women").

 

17. "Comfort stations" were established against the following background.

Soldiers in war zones were put in extremely poor living conditions and

abused. They were completely deprived of their human rights. As a result,

their repressed emotions often exploded against local residents in war zones

and occupied areas, which typically took the form of violence against women

and rape. Such explosion of violence to an extraordinary level was commonly

seen in areas occupied by the Japanese Military, including China, the

Philippines and Indonesia in particular. The core parts of the Japanese

Military, though knowing these facts, did not take active measures to prevent

 

such crimes. The provisions of the Criminal Code of the Army applied to rape

only when done along with looting, before it was amended in 1942.24  Also,

there were so few military police personnel that cases of rape were rarely

taken up. Even when case of rape were uncovered, the regular Criminal Code,

rather than that of the Army, was applied to most of them. As rape was an

offence subject to prosecution only upon complaint in the regular Criminal

Code, it was not exceptional for the soldier who committed rape to kill his

victim so as not to be prosecuted.

 

18. Rather, the Japanese military forces tolerated soldiers’ violent

behaviour against women in war zones and occupied areas so that their

repressed emotions and indignation might not explode at superiors. In some

cases, the officers even induced soldiers to practice violence on female

residents.25

 

19. Note: The total number of the women victims put to military sexual

slavery (including Korean, Chinese, Taiwanese, Filipino, Indonesian, Japanese

 

and other women) is extremely difficult to obtain. The effort to obtain very

rough estimates demonstrated by Dr. YOSHIMI Yoshiaki is as follows:

a. Minimum

1) The Army had a standard of access to one "comfort woman" for every hundred

soldiers to be provided by the Army.

2) The total number of military personnel overseas (both Navy and Army)

was about 3,500,000 at the largest. The forces at the utmost forefront were

not very

often with such women, and even the forces elsewhere were not necessarily

with

them. So the total number of soldiers can be set at 3,000,000 as a base for

calculation.

3) It is hard to know the alternation rate of "comfort women", but let us

tentatively call it at 1.5. Then:

   3,000,000÷100 X 1.5 = 45,000

If we add the estimate number of women that was not grasped by the core of

the military, headquarters of armies and area armies, the estimation will be

about 5,000,000. This would be the minimum.

b. maximum

1) There was another standard, which was seen by brokers and proprietors in

sex

trade of the time as the ideal ratio for brothels, of one woman per thirty

men

[potential clients]. This is a rather unrealistic ratio for this case.

2) Let us increase the rate of alternation to 2, though this is rather an

unrealistic estimation. Then:

  3,000,000 ÷30 X 2 = 200,000

  This would be a clue to the maximum.

When the number of those women who were  held and subjected to multiple rape

for a period of time [but not within the establishment of "comfort stations"]

 

is taken into account, the minimum would be much bigger than the 50,000, as

stated above.

[Please note that the total number of the women victims put to military

sexual slavery is yet to be estimated, presenting reasonable grounds to the

calculation.]

 

III. INDIVIDUAL CHARGES

 

A. Sexual enslavement "UEDA Yoko" (an assumed name) and other Japanese

"comfort women"

 

Defendants:

USHIJIMA Mitsuru (Commander of the 32nd Army),

HONGO Yoshio (Commander of the 62nd Division),

CHO Isami (Chief of Staff of the 32nd Army)

 

20. From at least August 1944 to June 1945, Defendant USHIJIMA Mitsuru served

 

as Commander of the 32nd Army posted in Okinawa, and Defendant HONGO Yoshio

as Commander of the 62nd Division (Ishi Corps) under the 32nd Army. Around

the summer 1944, these Defendants, in collusion with each other, made an

adjutant of a certain unit make a request to the Naha Police Station for

permission for establishing "comfort stations", and made the adjutant order

the managment office Tsuji Yukaku [quarter of licensed brothels] in the city

of Naha [Naha is the main city of the islands of Okinawa] to conscript

*juris* [*juri* is a local blanket term for the women who are professional

entertainers but also provide sexual service at times, and the women who are

regular licensed prostitutes] who were at work in the Tsuji quarters. Through

 

such means including the above, they made approximately 500 *juris* from the

Tsuji quarters work as "comfort women" [for the military] in a total of

fifteen "comfort stations", thus sexually enslaving them including UEDA Yoko

(an assumed name), who was made a "comfort woman" at a "comfort station" set

up at the 27th field water purification unit.

 

21. Defendant CHO Isami served as Chief of Staff of the 32nd Army posted in 

Okinawa at least from August 1944 to June 1945. After the U.S. military

landing on the Okinawan Main Island on April 1st, 1945, he made between ten

and twenty *geishas* [professional entertainers] and between ten and twenty

*juris* put in the cave where the core part of the headquarters of the 32nd

Army stayed in the city of Shuri,   gave the order that these women were made

 

to work as "comfort women" exclusively for officers of the core part of the

said headquarters, and by doing so sexually enslaving these women.

 

22. Immediately after the aforementioned adjutant ordered the management

office of the Tsuji quarters, Naha, to conscript the *juris* there as

"comfort women", a great number of these women rushed to Naha Police Station

to ask permission to give up their license [i.e. retire from prostitution].

This fact shows clearly that there was a  fundamental difference between

being engaged in prostitution and being made sex slaves as "comfort women",

and that those women who accepted becoming prostitutes firmly rejected

becoming "comfort women". It demonstrates clearly that a woman who had been

working in a brothel was in fact a victim of the crime of sexual enslavement

[, once she was made a "comfort woman" ].

 

B. Sexual enslavement of "SAWADA Noriko" (an assumed name) and other Japanese

 

"comfort women"

 

Defendants:

KOBAYASHI Seizou (Governor General of Taiwan),

KONDO Nobutake (Commander General of the 5th Fleet),

ANDO Rikichi (Commander of the 21st  Army),

KATO Kyohei (President of Taiwan Colonization Company),

MORIOKA Jiro (Director-General of Government-General of Taiwan),

ARITA Hachiro (Foreign Minister of HIRANUMA Kiichiro Cabinet)

 

23. At the time of the Japanese Army's invasion and occupation of Hainan

Island in  February 1939, Defendant KONDO Nobutake served as Commander

General of the 5th Fleet of the Japanese Navy, ANDO Rikichi as Commander of

the 21st Army of the Japanese Army, and ARITA Hachiro as Foreign Minister of

HIRANUMA Kiichiro Cabinet. In February 1939, when these three Defendants made

 

the representatives of the three ministries of the War, Navy and Foreign

Affairs hold a joint three-ministry meeting and drow up occupation policy

plans for Hainan Island, the three planned, in collusion with each other, to

establish "comfort stations" as a part of the occupation policy. In March

1939 they made Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Navy in Haikou, where

the headquarter of the 5th Fleet was, to ask the Taiwan Colonization Company,

 

whose president was Defendant KATO Kyohei, to build "comfort stations". By

doing the above, the first three Defendants made the critical decision for

sexually enslaving a big number of women including Victim SAWADA Noriko (an

assumed name), then, through the said Taiwan Colonization Company*s actual

building so many "comfort stations" within Hainan Island, in response to

their request, sexually  enslaved the many women including the said Victim

SAWADA.

 

24. Around April 1939, Defendant KATO Kyohei as President of Taiwan

Colonization Company, in collusion with KOBAYASHI Seizo, Governor General of

Taiwan, and MORIOKA Jiro, Director General of Government General of Taiwan,

transported to "comfort stations" in Haikou "specially required personnel" (3

 

managers, 4 *geigis* [entertainer-prostitutes], 7 *shakufus*

[waitress-prostitutes], 2 waitresses, 1 cook, and 2 odd-job persons)

including the said Victim SAWADA Noriko, thus sexually enslaving at least the

 

11 women including SAWADA.

 

25. For the leaders of the Japanese military and government, not only it was

important to prevent fuelling the anti-Japanese sentiment through frequent

occurrence of rape, prevent the decay of war capacity through transmission of

 

venereal diseases, to improve the morale by soldiers* discharging the stress,

 

to prevent information leaks through intimate exchanges of the soldiers and

local women and so on, as stated earlier, but it was also crucial to prevent

"daughters of good families" among Japanese women become "comfort women" and

to acquire a significant supply of women as the  source of the supply of

healthy Japanese boys as future soldiers of the imperial military (often

referred to as "*sekishi* to the emperor"). The cases of licensed prostitutes

 

to be conscripted as "comfort women" was one of the most typical cases of

Japanese women to be subjected to long-term and repetitive sexual violence as

 

such. The other typical patterns include the women [girls] of poor mountain

or farming communities being sold to pimps or proprietors, and the women,

again of the poor strata, being made "comfort women" through deception such

as being told that they would "tend to the need of the Japanese soldiers" or

be given a job as a typist, etc. Those Japanese women with the experience in

prostitution or of the poor strata were, to the eyes of the leaders of the

Japanese military and government, mainly the potential source of pleasure,

rather than to play the role of "the sex to give birth". Therefore, in the

similar way as any woman of a belligerent or occupied State was a potential

victim of wartime sexual violence by the Japanese military, the Japanese

women with the experience in prostitution or of the poor strata were

potential victims of wartime sexual violence by the military of their own

country.

 

C. Sexual enslavement of the women in areas other than the six victimised

countries or regions represented at the present Tribunal

 

26. The Japanese Army set up comfort stations at nearly all areas under

Japanese occupation. According to numerous documents, Japanese "comfort

stations" were established in Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand,

India (Andaman and Nicobar Islands), Papua New Guinea, Guam (USA), Micronesia

 

and other Pacific islands in addition to the six countries and regions

represented at the present Tribunal . It is likely that there were also

comfort stations in Laos and Cambodia, although this has not yet been

confirmed. Dutch and Eurasians were also forced to be "comfort women". All

the above-mentioned areas were invaded and occupied by the Southern

Expeditionary Army. 26

 

27. As for Vietnam, immediately after the Japanese occupied the northern part

 

of Indochina in September 1940, Lieutenant General NISHIMURA Takuma,

Commander of the Indochina Expeditionary Army, discussed with his Chief of

Staff on the matter of setting up "comfort stations" as soon as possible. It

seems that Vietnam was the first place in South-east Asia where a "comfort

station" was established.

 

28. After the breakout of the Asia-Pacific War, "comfort stations" were

established in Alorstar, Malaya in December 1941, in Hat Yai and Singora,

Thailand in January 1942, and in addition, in Singapore after the Japanese

occupation in February 1942. It has been confirmed so far that "comfort

stations" were in operation in at least in 24 cities in Malay Peninsula. In

Kuala Lumpur alone, there were sixteen "comfort stations" in seven different

areas. The majority of "comfort women" in Kuala Lumpur were Chinese residents

 

of Malaya, followed by Koreans, Thais, Javanese, Indians and mixed

Malay-Chinese.

 

29. In March, 1942, in Kuala Pilah, a town in Negeri Sembilan, Malaysia, the

Japanese garrison commander ordered the leader of the town to recruit women.

The leader recruited eighteen Chinese women and handed them over the Japanese

 

garrison. While recruitment in this area was in progress the Japanese army

was conducting a clean-up operation, massacring large numbers of natives they

 

regarded as anti-Japanese elements.

 

30. According to the testimony of a woman (identity closed) who was then a

girl of sixteen, living in a suburb of Kuala Lumpur, Japanese soldiers forced

 

their way into her house and carried her off, along with her brother. While

her brother never came back, she was repeatedly gang-raped and then forced to

 

become a "comfort woman".

 

31. Several recruitment methods were employed in South-east Asia; such as

ordering local leaders to recruit women, forcible abduction (especially

common in the Philippines), recruitment by fraud on the pretext of offering

jobs as office girls, nurses and so on. In the early stages of the war, while

 

Quartermaster Corps were in charge of establishing "comfort stations",

individual troop units also set up "comfort stations" of their own. The

military administration later took charge of them.

 

32. In Indonesia, the Japanese army picked up two or three hundred young

Dutch women from internee camps and forced them to become "comfort women". In

 

Palembang, Sumatra, the army tried to intemidate thirty-two Australian nurses

 

into becoming "comfort women" for Japanese officers but they refused. After

they registered their complaints with the Red Cross, Japanese intimidation

ceased.27  Although the Japanese army at least made a show of trying to

obtain the consent of the Dutch and Australian women (though these efforts

often took the form of fraud or deception), in the case of Asian women

"consent" was not an issue.

 

33. It is likely that the majority of "comfort women" for the Japanese

military in South-east Asia and the Pacific areas were local women. In

addition, not a few women were kept as mistresses by Japanese officers. With

the exception of the Philippines and Indonesia, where there are organizations

 

supporting former "comfort women", throughout South-east Asia former "comfort

 

women" are still neglected, unable to come forth. Their physical and mental

suffering must be extremely grave beyond one*s imagination.

 

[end of 1st half, jp indictment]

 

D. Charges against Defendant Hirohito, Emperor Showa

 

34. Defendant Hirohito, Emperor Showa

Defendant Hirohito, Emperor Showa:

1) was the head of the Empire of Japan, exercised the prerogatives as a

sovereign (Article 4 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan), had the

supreme command of the Army and Navy (Article 11),  and was in a position of

the commander-in-chief of the Japanese military since his coronatoin in 1926

until Japan's defeat in August 1945;

2) led the war and war strategies based on the information supplied to him by

 

the military and on his own strategic judgments since around 1931 when the

so-called Fifteen-Year War began;

3) particularly upon the February 26 Incident of 1936, occurred in the year

after the "Clarification of the Japanese Body Politic Movement" (the

so-called The-Emperor-as-an-Organ Theory Incident) of 1935, encouraged and

urged the hesitant Army leadership to suppress the Incident, thereby

enhancing his authority as the supreme commander and;

4) involved himself actively as the supreme commander in the development of

the all-out war against China (the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, the

expansion of war zones into Shanghai in the same year, the establishment of

the Imperial Military Headquarters in November of the same year, the

occupation of Nanjing in December) and in the process of the war against the

United States and the United Kingdom after December 8, 1941, and he was in a

position to order the Navy and Army' High Commands and the Imperial Military

Headquarters to make sure that these commanding organs issue the Japanese

Military strategic orders that would abide by international law.

 

a. Liability for the Rape of Nanking

 

[Facts and Applicable Laws]

 

35. During the period from December 1937 to around February 1938, in the City

 

of Nanking, serving as the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Army in the war

 

against China, Defendant H, in the capacity stated as above and such,

neglected his duty as the commander-in-chief who should control the behavior

of the rank and file of the troops, letting the soldiers who fought the

Battle of Nanking, which he commanded, rape the civilian Chinese women on a

mass-scale and during a long period, repeatedly and incessantly, killed many

of these women after raping them, and those women who barely survived the

killings to still have wounds on their sexual organs, and scars on other

parts of the body from attempting to resist the rape, and PTSD that is left

incurable to this day, besides letting the Japanese soldiers massacre tens of

 

thousands of civilian Chinese people, and commit serious crimes such as

setting these Chinese civilians' residences and properties on fire and

ruthlessly looting them.  Therefore, Defendant H committed crimes against

humanity.

 

[Prosecutor's Allegation]

 

36. The Nanking Atrocities that included the raping of a vast number of

civilian Chinese women described above covered a large area and lasted for a

long period of time, were committed repeatedly and relentlessly, and were

indeed a series of seriously criminal behaviors which appalled the world.

Therefore, if Defendant H, in the capacity stated as above and such, made any

 

kind of effort to meet his responsibility as the commander-in-chief, then he

must have been able to be informed of these behaviors either through briefing

 

by his military staffs or members of the imperial family, news reports, or by

 

accounts from the Imperial headquarters which were informed by European or

American journalists' reports of the Rape of Nanking to the world media

sources. Defendant H neglected his responsibility even though he had the duty

 

to control the soldiers who participated in the Battle of Nanking in the

troops he was commanding, and to prevent them from violating the laws of war

by committing such crimes as rape of civilian women in a large area for a

long period of time, repeatedly and consecutively, massacre of tens of

thousands of civilian Chinese people, and setting these Chinese civilians'

residences and properties on fire, ruthlessly looting them.  Therefore, his

neglect of such a duty is against international law, according to the

"principle of commander's responsibility" established after the "Yamashita

Case" in the Manila Military Tribunal of the United States Military

Commission.

 

b. Liability for cases of "comfort stations"

 

[Facts and Applicable Laws]

 

37. During Japan's war against China and against the Allied Powers, the

Commander-in-Chief of Japan (H) neglected his duty to control the behaviors

and operations of rank and file of troops, enabling the making of a vast

number of women from Korea, Taiwan, China, the Philippines and Indonesia into

 

sex slaves for Japanese officers and soldiers, putting these women in the

"comfort stations" that were set up over extremely vast areas that are shown

in the attached table and map (the so-called "comfort stations" map) in the

Asia-Pacific region during the period from at the latest around 1932 during

the First Shanghai Incident to Japan's defeat in August 1945 (in Taiwan, till

 

the end of that year).  Therefore, Defendant H committed crimes against

humanity.

 

[Prosecutor's Allegation]

 

38. The so-called "comfort stations" were first set up in order to prevent

the anti-Japanese sentiments in China from aggravating further because of the

 

Japanese soldiers' rampant raping of Chinese women at the time of the First

Shanghai Incident in 1932 and then grew into full-scale upon all-out invasion

 

into China in 1937. And given the large scale of expansion of battle zones of

 

this war of aggression, and its areal vastness and systematic nature

manifested in the fact that "comfort stations" were set up even in the very

forefront battle lines in the Asia-Pacific region, it would have been

impossible for the military leadership to fail to notice the existence of the

 

"comfort stations."  In fact, Defendant H's second younger brother Prince

Takamatsunomiya noted of "comfort women" in his diary. The Defendant himself

spoke of deterioration of military disciplines in the face of the

prolongation of war, and problems with keeping the public peace and order.

Therefore, we can assume his knowledge of "facilities for sexual comfort"

that were the main theme of the measures taken against these problems.

 

39. Given the above-stated vastness and speed of expansion of battle zones in

 

the war of aggression, and also considering how to set up "comfort stations"

at every single depot (supply stations) of the very forefront battle lines in

 

the whole Asia-Pacific region up until the end of the war in 1945, it would

have been easy for Defendant H to understand that women had to be recruited

by force, coercion, threat, deception and/or allurement, and that the

collected women would be forced to have sexual intercourse with a large

number of soldiers day after day, and that the women would be forced to be

transported along with the troops and military supplies whenever the

battlelines moved around, and that in other words, the actual situation of

"comfort stations" would be nothing but a sexual slavery system that was

against the international humanitarian law, if Defendant H made any kind of

effort to meet his responsibility as the supreme commander.

 

40. However, it was either that Defendant H neglected his duty to learn about

 

the actual situation of "comfort stations" that was nothing but sexual

slavery which violated international humanitarian law, or that Defendant H

had realized that the "comfort stations" would be a sexual slavery system in

and of itself which was against international humanitarian law, but thought

he had no choice other than setting up the comfort stations in order to

prevent the already-strong anti-Japanese sentiments from aggravating further,

 

to protect soldiers' physical fighting capacity against venereal diseases, to

 

boost soldiers' morale by securing outlets for their stress and repression,

to prevent vital information from leaking through soldiers' and officers'

personal/private interaction with local women of enemy countries.  In either

case, he neglected his duty to stop the Army or the civilian brokers from

recruiting the women by force, coercion, threat, deception and/or allurement,

 

letting a vast number of these women be made into "comfort women," i.e., into

 

sexual slaves in the whole region of Asia-Pacific until Japan's defeat in

1945, and upon the end of the war, although he was responsible for these

women's return to their homes, he abandoned them.

 

41. Given his spiritual positioning that equaled to that of "a god" vis-a-vis

 

Japanese soldiers, had he decided to abolish the "comfort stations," it would

 

have been possible to eradicate the sexual slavery system.  And given the

depth and magnitude of the human rights violation which the victimized women

experienced, and the grave consequences thereof, Defendant H's neglect of his

 

duty to stop the Army to recruit the women by force, coercion, threat,

deception and/or allurement holds significant illegality in reference to

international law.

 

Table: "List of Comfort Stations" (Contents omitted here)

 

China

Taiwan

The Philippines

Indonesia

Malaysia

Burma

Vietnam

Indian Andaman Islands, Nikobal Islands

Papua New Guinea (Rabaul, Kabien) and other islands in the Pacific

Saipan, Truk, Palau in the South Pacific and American Guam

Okinawa

Japan

 

see also: the so-called map of "comfort stations"

 

IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND TO THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

 

A. Insufficiency of investigation and disclosure of the truth

 

42. On August 15, 1945, the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam

Declaration and made unconditional surrender. Article 11 of the Declaration

provided the prosecution of war criminals. Around this time, many official

government and military documents were burned by a decision of the Cabinet.

The Army Staff and the War Ministry sent a note to all army units ordering

them to destroy all confidential documents. They even pressured the House of

Representatives and newspaper companies to destroy records of confidential

meetings and photographs of prisoners of war.  The similar order was

dispatched within the Navy.  The Home Ministry also decided to burn official

documents. HARA Bunbei (he became a chairperson of the House of Councilors

and the chief trustee of the Asian Women's Fund), OKUNO Seiryou (he later

became a member of the House of Representatives,  Minister of Education, and

Minister of Home Affairs), and KOBAYASHI Yosaji (he later became  Vice

Minister of Home Affairs and the president of the Yomiuri newspaper) all

shared the responsibility of notifying local governments and police

departments of this order.  These facts show clearly that those actors were

thinking about the war crime tribunals that would be held after the war, and

that they burned documents in order to destroy the evidence of war crimes

they had committed.  Such conducts of theirs hiding or destroying documents

in relation to war crimes may well constitute violations of international

obligation that Japan accepted by its surrender.(see expert opinion by

Yoshida.)

 

43. For a long time after the war, the Japanese government had long made no

effort to investigate or even acknowledged the existence of the so-called

"comfort women," the "731 Military Unit" and so on.  To this day, it denies

even the existence of basic official documents regarding the "731 Military

Unit". In 1992, the Japanese government at last promised to investigate the

issue of "comfort women" as a result of being pressured by the international

community. However, the first report of this investigation denied the

Japanese government's involvement in the matter. In August 1992, in the

second report, the Japanese government finally admitted the involvement of

the military and the government and police, and that there was coercion in

recruiting and using of the women.

      However, both these reports were very vague about the roles that the

government and military had played. At the time of investigation for these

reports, the Japanese government did not look at certain archives saying that

 

there were no related documents. But at the archives at the Police, the

Ministry of Welfare and the pre-war Supreme Court, which were amongst those

archives that the government had not looked, later some important documents

related to "comfort women" issues were found. These documents were discovered

 

by non-officials and by accident. Even today, the Japanese government does

not show interest in finding truth of this issue.  But many academics and

others are  certain that at places including the Archives of the Institute of

 

Defence, Defence Agency, must still be many relevant documents that have not

been disclosed or even organized.

 

B. Non-fulfilment of duties for apology, reparation, or prosecution

 

44. The Japanese government has purposely used a discourse of falsehood and

distortion, which openly denies the victims' status. These acts have been

done repeatedly and continuously, and have hurt the self-esteem of many

survivors and others. Not only the facts were denied, but also, comments and

policy made by the Japanese government officials against the legal status and

 

rights of the victims -- all of which have constantly hurt the survivors

deeply. In particular, these officials keep to the technical defence, and

ignore its duty to prosecute and punish war criminals and to provide the

victims with reparation. They have also tried to force the victims to accept

the "resolution" through a "private fund" (the Asian Women*s Fund,

established by the government in August 1995). A response to the survivors

through a "private fund" can be a way to meet the moral responsibility of the

 

State, but cannot be accepted as an appropreate way to meet the legal

responsibility of the State. The legal responsibility the Japanese government

 

must fulfil still remains. The "defence of international agreements", the

main ground for the Japanese government to argue that it has no legal

responsibility in the issue of "comfort women", is in fact groundless for the

 

following reasons:

 

45. First, Japan has a duty to prosecute and punish crimes prohibited under

international law, but keeps neglecting to fulfil the duty. There is no such

bilateral or multilateral agreement that might remove this duty from Japan.

Therefore, none of the international agreement or treaty that Japan has

ratified is a defence for Japan to say that the issue of duty for punishment

has already been settled through international agreements.  This duty is not

subject to a statute of limitations. When a State is in breach of this duty,

then it is liable to pay compensation. Therefore, Japan is liable to provide

the "comfort women" survivors with compensation to make up for the damage

suffered by them due to its failure to duly prosecute and punish war

criminals.

 

46. Second, in 1972, when Japan settled the peace issue with China, Japan

agreed to the condition that China does not waive the claims of its

nationals. Therefore, regardless of Article 14 (b) of the San Francisco Peace

 

Treaty, Article 26 of the same treaty is applied and one must understand that

 

no claims of an individual victim are waived for those who are national to

any country that is a party to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan cannot

claim that the issue of compensation to individual victims has been settled

by international agreements in this way.

 

C. Leaving the PTSD of the victimise persons to grow worse

 

47. The victims who had been put in “comfort stations” or "rape centres"

have suffered physical and psychological pain which is different from the

other war crimes because it comes from sexual violence. They had been

confined to particular places and raped constantly by many soldiers for a

long period of time. Constant sexual violence brought them so grave physical

injuries that many of them were died of illness at the time. The survivors

have also undergone vast range of illnesses including venereal diseases,

sterility and different kinds of ill health including palpitation, headache,

physical pain of different parts of the body, gastroenteric trouble, etc.

 

48. An experience of a grave event, the pain and agony of which brings is so

serious to overcome, remains with the person after the event　as trauma and

often causes PTSD(post-traumatic syndromes).  Many cases of suicide or mental

 

trouble under the confinement are reported by the survivors of the “comfort

women” and they themselves show serious PTSD. Survivors themselves report

their symptoms and examples of such reports are found in various sources

including the testimonies made by the women survivors themselves, the

descriptions in the indictments for and examinations of plaintiff at court

hearings of various civil lawsuits in which the survivors are suing the

Japanese government, the testimonies at different occasions including for the

 

United Nations Human Rights mechanisms, and at international public hearings.

34  The medical diagnoses of thirty plaintiffs of the lawsuit of the Filipino

 

women by Christine R. GATES,35 of two of them by MITSUHASHI Junko,36 and six

plaintiffs of the case of China's Shanxi Province by KUWAYAMA Norihiko,37

they manifest how serious the survivors’ symptoms are. Many women raped

violently in their teens, which can be also considered in respect of child

abuse, and they have suffered strong fear and insomnia, fright, or depressed

state until today even after over fifty years.

 

49. The psychiatrists who diagnosed the women point out that it is taking

very long a time for them to recover from PTSD. The patriarchal social system

 

lies in the background to their obstructed recovery. In a patriarchal society

 

where being made subject to sexual violence is thought to be the shame of the

 

family or clan as well as the victim herself, she is branded an “impure” or

 

"dirty" woman. She is, therefore, unable to speak out of her injury, is

deprived of her own rights to self-esteem and to seek for happiness, and

obliged to be keep silent with pain and agony, without any care and support

of the people around her. One of the diagnoses points out that the victims?

PTSD may have influence on the next generation as some of the victims may

hurt themselves and their children with sudden violence as a result of her

grave trauma.38

     Consequently, for the victims to recover from such serious mental and

emotional wounds,  providing them with an environment the safety of which

they can rely on, to speak about their experiences, sincere apologies and

compensation from their perpetrators, prosecution and punishment of the

perpetrators are crucial. The Japanese government has, however, never tried

to meet the cries of the survivors, consistently denied its own legal

responsibility, never put serious efforts to fact-finding and disclosure of

the truth or providing proper redress to victims, and ignored their PTSD. The

   psychological injury of the survivors has thus multiplied, and the PTSD has

 

been continuing.

 

V. FACTUAL GROUND TO THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

 

50. Until the end of WW2 or the Asia-Pacific War, the defendant H was the

head of the State and supreme commander of all the Japanese armed forces. In

addition, all of the above-mentioned defendants were leading members of the

Japanese military or government.

 

51. Around August 15, 1945, when the Japanese government accepted

unconditional surrender, Japan tried to destroy the evidence of war crimes.

The General Staff and the Army Ministry sent a notification to all army units

 

to order them to burn all confidential documents. The Navy issued a similar

order to all naval units. The Home Ministry also did so to local governments

and the police. These acts made it impossible or extremely difficult to find

facts and make the truth public.

 

52. When it was recognized that wartime sexual violence had neither been duly

 

prosecuted nor punished in the light of gender perspective in the Tokyo

Tribunal, the above defendants, including H, should have been prosecuted as

criminal defendants and properly punished as promptly as possible in the

Japanese court. (Such a procedure should have been adopted at least before

they are prosecuted here in the Women’s International War Crime Tribunal 55

years after the end of the War.) That is, Japan has continued to neglect the

duty to prosecute and punish the war criminals until this very day.

 

53. Many of the survivors of wartime sexual violence by the Japanese Military

 

have been suffering from mental aftereffects known as PTSD (post-traumatic

syndromes). There is a possibility that these mental aftereffects will be

reduced if the Japanese government acknowledges the historical facts and its

own legal responsibility for them, apologizes to the survivors, and takes

relevant compensatory measures. But the Japanese government has not yet fully

 

apologized nor taken such measures. As a matter of fact, the mental

aftereffects the survivors suffer have become progressively worse. It is

because Japanese government officials and Diet members have denied or

distorted the historical facts and repudiated the responsibility of the

Japanese government. It is also because of what the Japanese government

argues as the defendant in the proceedings at various Japanese domestic

courts, to which the women survivors have brought the matter. Moreover, the

decisions of the courts, which are an agent of the State, have continued to

decline the legal responsibility of the state of Japan as the defendant.

NAKASONE Yasuhiro, who mentions in his memoirs his stay in Indonesia during

the war and his involvement in establishing a "comfort station," became the

Prime Minister of Japan after the war. Even after the sufferings of "comfort

women" got fairly well-known, he has never tried to take a step to redress

them. These facts have also made the victims deeply aware what a different

path the wrongdoers and the victims of wartime sexual violence have walked

since the end of the war. This has further injured the victims' feelings.

 

54. It is the Japanese government that has caused such trauma to the victims.

 

Therefore, the Japanese government has an obligation to detect severe mental

aftereffects they suffer and to strive to heal or reduce them. Nevertheless,

the Japanese government has neglected these obligations for more than fifty

years since the end of the war. The government has not only passed over

severe PTSD the victims suffer, but also denied, distorted or ignored the

facts of wrongdoing. Moreover, the government has denied the responsibility

for them and worsened PTSD. Apart from the responsibility of the State of

Japan that is derived from war crimes committed by Japanese military officers

 

and government officials, this neglect of remedy -- the neglect of the

obligation by a person who should assume an obligation to remedy -- is

nothing but another illegal act after the war and also gives a state

responsibility to the Japanese government.

 

55. Japan is liable to compensate for the above-mentioned illegal conducts

done by Japanese military officers and government officials. (Such conducts

naturally constitute a tort because they constitute a crime.) Nevertheless,

Japan has not yet paid even a penny for compensation as a part of restitution

 

to recover from the damage brought by the illegal act. Now the Asian Women*s

Fund provides money only in exchange for the negation of the legal

responsibility of the State of Japan for compensation. Also, a gift of money

out of sympathy has no nature of payment for compensation. Therefore, the

establishment of this "private" fund is in no way be understood as that the

responsibility for compensation that the State of Japan is obliged is duly

fulfilled. 

 

56. As mentioned above, Japan has not fulfilled obligations to find and

disclose the truth about the past war crimes and crimes against humanity nor

duties to prosecute and punish those responsible for such crimes. Given this

fact, it can never be said that Japan has taken necessary measures to prevent

 

war crimes and crimes against humanity from occurring again in the future.

 

VI. CONTENT OF THE STATE RESPONSIBILITY THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS TO

FULFIL

 

57. The responsibility of the State of Japan that arises on the above grounds

 

(paras. 50 through 56) is serious and grave in light of the defendants’

serious infringement on the human rights of victimized women and the gravity

of the damage as a whole that surpasses all imagination. Just like the United

 

States of America, which was judged to be guilty in the Russell Tribunal for

its involvement as a state in the Vietnam War, an aggressive war as a crime

against humanity, the State of Japan should be judged to be guilty for its

aggressive war in the Asia-Pacific region and the grave damage from sexual

violence during the war.

      Now Japan must take up and implement the following measures in order to

fulfil this serious and grave state responsibility at very long last:

 

58. Investigate and disclose the truth. Japan should establish a fact-finding

 

body to clarify the entire damage from sexual violence during the aggressive

war, and immediately make open all war crime-related documents under the

control of the government to help private citizens’ efforts to find the

truth.

 

59. Prosecute and punish those who were responsible. Japanese prosecutors

should prosecute the defendants who still survive, and the Japanese court

should give them suitable punishment except death penalty.

 

60. Legislation for reparation. The Japanese government should pay victims a

proper amount of reparation as soon as possible. In order to provide with

compensation as many survivors in as many areas and as quickly as possible,

legislation for such implementation would be the most appropriate.

      Within Japan already, there are four written drafts for such legislation

 

already written by different groups. Three of them are drafted by mainly MPs

and are referred to as the Democratic Party’s Bill, the Communist Party’s

Bill, and the Social Democrats* Bill. The other one is referred to as the

Outline for the Bill, drafted by the practising lawyers of the network of the

 

panels of lawyers for the survivors in the post-war reparation cases. The

three above-mentioned bills by the political parties were officially

submitted, as bills, to the House of Councilors on 30th of October, 2000. It

is just for the state of Japan to base its legislation on one of those three

bills if that will bring about the ealier legislation than otherwise. Amongst

 

the four bills, the so-called Outline for the Bill is the best in the way

that it is the only one that reflects the voices of the survivors themselves,

 

contacted through various local NGOs supporting the survivors of wartime

sexual violence on the day-to-day basis.

 

61. Prevent recurrence and ensure accurate history education as a minimum

preventative measure. The Japanese government should take necessary and

sufficient measures to prevent wartime sexual violence from occurring again

in the future. One of the first things to be done to prevent the future

repetition of wartime sexual violence is no doubt to educate children

accordingly in school, so that they will understand as a crucial part of such

 

education the gravity of the damage suffered by the victims of wartime sexual

 

violence committed in the past, and the seriousness of the responsibility and

 

accountability on the part of the perpetrator. Therefore, to ensure that the

minimum of the educational environment for such is provided, it is crucial

that there is a clear entry of these things in the textbooks used at school.

      However, according to what media reports, such as in the 10 Sept 2000

issue of Mainichi Shinbun (newspaper), they have found that the drafts of

history textbooks to be used in primary and lower secondary [compulsory]

schools throughout the country starting the schoolyear [fiscal year] 2002,

prepared by eight different publishers, have greatly decreased their entries

regarding the issue of "military comfort women" upon application for the

approval of the ministry of education. Only three out of those eight

publishers included anything regarding the issue in their drafts, although

previously seven of them used to do so.  And even in those comments that are

included, the angle that Japan was in fact the perpetrator is weakened

greatly. What should be noted here is that this change did not take place as

a result of the official suggestion procedure by the ministry of education,

but had been already made at the time of application, rather as a result of

what should be referred to as voluntary self-censorship. This indicates quite

 

strongly that there may have been some kind of political pressure placed upon

 

the textbook publishers by the right wing and the people who claim to have

the more "liberalist view of history" or revisionists [translator*s note:

they criticize the post-war history and education of Japan, that sees the war

 

until 1945 as Japan’s aggression, as with the "self-abusive view", and

promote the "more liberal" and "fairer" view of Japanese history, which

claims that the war was to emancipate the whole of the Asian region from the

West, which is the same argument the Japanese right wing make].

      The government of Japan in this situation, should provide through the

means of its ministry of education’s official opinion in the procedure for

official approval of textbooks, with the textbook publishers, the view that

the gravity of the damage suffered by the victims of wartime sexual violence

committed in the past, and the seriousness of the responsibility and

accountability on the part of the perpetrator should be clearly be a part of

their textbooks, and thus to meet its own responsibility it has over

education for the future generations .

 

[end]